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A  J O Y F U L  H E A R T  I S  G O O D  M E D I C I N E :
S E X U A L I T Y  C O N V E R S I O N  B A N S  I N  T H E  C O U R T S
 yatt ore*
ABSTRACT
Led by California and New Jersey, states have begun to ban
Sexual Orientation Change Efforts (SOCE) for minors. States have
targeted SOCE, also called ‘gay conversion therapy,’ by regulating
state licensure requirements for mental health professionals. Con-
servative legal groups have challenged these bans in federal court,
alleging a variety of constitutional violations sounding in the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. More specifically, these legal groups
propose theories claiming that the bans infringe upon individuals’
freedom of speech, free exercise, and parental rights. In this Note, I
survey the history of these bans, as well as court decisions that have
rejected constitutional challenges to the laws. This Note then pro-
poses and rejects another potential theory challenging the bans under
the Due Process Clause’s right to privacy. Finally, this Note proposes
that this new wave of state legislation reflects a wider shift in the
LGBT community’s priorities, tactics, and messages.
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In 2012, California made headlines by becoming the first state to leg-
islate that “[u]nder no circumstances shall a mental health provider engage
in sexual orientation change efforts with a patient under 18 years of age.”1
Perhaps recognizing the significant change in public policy this bill would
entail, the California assembly carefully tailored the bill to address oppo-
nents’ concerns by, for example, removing an informed consent require-
ment on conversion therapy for adults.2 In addition, the bill did not prevent
conversion therapists from announcing their opinions on sexual orientation,
but rather banned a particular treatment, and only for minors. Following
California’s lead, New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie signed a similar ban into
law in August 2013.3
Socially conservative legal groups led opposition to the California law
by suing in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California. The complaints allege three theories of constitutional violation:
1. S. 1172, 2011-12 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (codified at CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§ 865 (Westlaw through Ch. 531 of 2014 Reg. Sess., Res. Ch. 1 of 2013-2014 2nd
Ex. Sess., and all propositions on 2014 ballots)).
2. See S. COMM. ON BUS., PROFESSIONS AND ECON. DEV., HEALING ARTS: SEXUAL
ORIENTATION CHANGE EFFORTS, SB 1172 (Cal. 2012), available at http://www.leg
info.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_1151-1200/sb_1172_cfa_20120419_155807_sen
_comm.html.
3. Kate Zernike, Christie Signs Gay ‘Conversion Therapy’ Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19,
2013, at A14.
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Freedom of Speech, Free Exercise of Religion, and the “fundamental right to
direct the upbringing of one’s child.”4 At the core of these complaints lie
alleged injuries to three sorts of rights: (1) the right of the minor to take
steps to curtail unwanted romantic attractions; (2) the right of the therapist
to provide appropriate mental health therapies according to his or her con-
science; and (3) the right of the minor’s parents or guardians to provide
adequate and appropriate medical and spiritual care in accordance with
their faith.
This Note surveys the legal challenges brought against bans on Sexual
Orientation Change Efforts (“SOCE”), as well as the history that led to the
SOCE bans. In Part I, this Note examines why the California and New
Jersey legislatures decided to ban SOCE for minors, as well as the regulatory
structures they used to accomplish that goal. Parts II and III of this Note
analyze the legal claims that opponents of SOCE bans alleged, starting with
First Amendment claims and then moving on to the substantive due process
claims.5 Finally, Parts IV and V of this Note anticipate possible challenges
to SOCE bans that plaintiffs have not yet alleged and articulate how the
movement for SOCE bans fits into the wider LGBT movement’s agenda.
I. HOW AND WHY DO STATES BAN SOCE?
A. What are SOCE?
The American Psychological Association Task Force on Appropriate
Therapeutic Responses to Sexual Orientation defines SOCE as:
[M]ethods that aim to change a same-sex sexual orientation (e.g.,
behavioral techniques, psychoanalytic techniques, medical ap-
proaches, religious and spiritual approaches) to heterosexual, re-
gardless of whether mental health professionals or lay individuals
(including religious professionals, religious leaders, social groups,
and other lay networks, such as self-help groups) are involved.6
SOCE have historically consisted of a wide variety of therapeutic ap-
proaches, ranging from behavioral (electroshock therapy, satiation therapy,
4. Complaint at 2, Pickup v. Brown, No. 2:12-CV-02497-KJM-EF (E.D. Cal. Oct. 4,
2012), 2012 WL 5981507.
5. The California cases, Pickup v. Brown and Welch v. Brown, also contained void-for-
vagueness claims, which are not discussed in this Note.
6. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIA-
TION TASK FORCE: APPROPRIATE THERAPEUTIC RESPONSES TO SEXUAL ORIENTA-
TION 12 n.5 (2009) [hereinafter APPROPRIATE THERAPEUTIC RESPONSES TO SEXUAL
ORIENTATION].
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orgasmic reconditioning, etc.), to cognitive (attempting to change thought
patterns, redirecting thoughts, hypnosis, etc.), and educational (instruction
in dating skills, affection training, etc.).7 However, “following the removal
of homosexuality from the DSM8 . . . [b]ehavior therapists became increas-
ingly concerned that aversive therapies designed as SOCE for homosexuality
were inappropriate, unethical, and inhumane.”9 The law responded to this
shift in psychological standards of care. One court noted that “aversion
techniques . . . have not been used by any ethical and licensed mental health
professional in decades.”10
Since the passage of California’s law in 2012, several states have either
banned SOCE for minors or taken significant steps towards banning SOCE
for minors. As of November 2014, such bans are law in New Jersey and
California, and legislators have proposed similar bills in Pennsylvania, Ohio,
New York, Illinois, Washington, Virginia, Maryland, Minnesota, Florida,
Hawaii, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Vermont, Wisconsin, Michigan, and
the District of Columbia.11 Regardless of the state, the bills propose a ban
on SOCE for minors in a similar way: they focus on already regulated con-
duct by “a person who performs counseling as part of the person’s profes-
sional training for any of these professions [professional licensed mental
health counselors].”12 Accordingly, the bills would not cover, for example,
7. Id. at 22.
8. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM”) is a commonly
used handbook of standard criteria for classifying mental disorders published by the
American Psychiatric Association. The DSM is currently in its fifth edition. See
DSM, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (2014), http://www.psychiatry.org/practice/dsm.
9. APPROPRIATE THERAPEUTIC RESPONSES TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra note 6, at
24.
10. King v. Christie, 981 F. Supp. 2d 296, 315 n.16 (D.N.J. 2013).
11. 11Assemb. 3371, 215th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2012) (codified at 2013 N.J. Sess. Law
Serv. § 45:1-54 - 1-55) (Westlaw through L.2014, c. 60 and J.R. No. 3); S. 1172,
2011-12 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (codified at CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865);
S. 872, 2013-14 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2013); S. 188, 130th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Ohio 2013); S. 4869, 236th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013); S. 3575, 98th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2014); H.R. 2451, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2014);
H.D. 1135, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2014); H.D. 91, 434th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Md. 2014) (withdrawn); H.R. 1906, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2014); H.B.
221, 2013-14 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2014) (failed to pass in Health Innovation Sub-
comm., May 02, 2014) (companion S. 240 failed to pass in Health Policy, May 02,
2014); S. 2204, 27th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2014) (companion H. 1789); H.R.
3907, 188th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2014); S. 2510, 2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(R.I. 2014); H.R. 755, 2013-14 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2014); S. 481, 2013-
14 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2014) (failed to pass pursuant to S.J. Res. 1, 2013-14 Leg.,
101 Reg. Sess. (2014)); H.R. 5703, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2014); Council
501, 20th Period (D.C. 2013).
12. Assemb. 3371 § (2)(a), 215th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2012) (codified at 2013 N.J.
Sess. Law Serv. § 45:1-55(a) (Westlaw through L.2014, c. 60 and J.R. No. 3).
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unlicensed counseling from a spiritual leader. Across states, however, the
legislative language differs slightly in terms of the scope of minors protected.
Whereas California’s law bars change efforts only on the basis of sexual
orientation,13 New Jersey’s law,14 as well as the proposed bans in several
other states, covers sexual orientation as well as gender identity.15 Lastly, the
legislative language of SOCE bans, enacted or not, does not explicitly pro-
hibit affirmative therapies, which California has defined as those that “pro-
vide acceptance, support, and understanding of clients or the facilitation of
clients’ coping, social support, and identity exploration and development,
including sexual orientation-neutral interventions to prevent or address un-
lawful conduct or unsafe sexual practices; and . . . do not seek to change
sexual orientation.”16
B. How and Why Do States Attempt to Ban SOCE for Minors?
States that have enacted these bans recognize that SOCE harm the
mental health of minors.17 Accordingly, these states use their broad police
powers to regulate public health in order to protect minors from this psy-
chological harm.18 States’ broad police powers, as well as their powerful role
in licensing mental health professionals, mean that they are in a unique
13. S. 1172 § 2(b)(1), 2011-12 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (codified at CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE § 865). Although SB 1172 does not explicitly prevent nonaffirming
therapy for transgender youth, it does bar “efforts to change behaviors or gender
expressions,” § 2 (b)(1). Further, the Act states that “California has a compelling
interest in protecting . . . transgender youth.” § 1(n). Moreover, SB 1172 notes that
the American Psychoanalytic Association has found that “[p]sychoanalytic technique
does not encompass purposeful attempts to ‘convert,’ ‘repair,’ change or shift an
individual’s . . . gender identity or gender expression.” § 1(j). As a result, it is unclear
what the full effect SB 1172 has on nonaffirming therapy for transgender youth.
14. Assemb. 3371, 215th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2012) (codified at 2013 N.J. Sess. Law
Serv. § 45:1–54 - 1-55).
15. Attempts to change an individual’s gender identity do not include affirming transi-
tion therapy that provide support as an individual changes his/her outward gender
presentation or biological sex to conform with inner conceptions of his/her gender
identity. See, e.g., S. 4869, 236th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013) (“The term [SOCE]
does not include counseling for an individual seeking to transition from one gender
to another . . . .”).
16. S. 1172 § 2(b)(1), 2011–12 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (codified at CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE § 865).
17. For example, the California Legislature has asserted that it has, “a compelling interest
in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors, including lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgender youth, and in protecting its minors against exposure
to serious harms caused by sexual orientation change efforts.” § 1(n).
18. See, e.g., 39A C.J.S. Health & Environment § 1 (2014) (“Protection of the public
health is a primary duty of government since there is no public policy more impor-
tant than the protection of citizens from practices which may injure their health.”).
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position within the federal system to address this sort of psychological harm.
California and New Jersey use this power to enforce SOCE bans via licen-
sure and professional regulations, which fall within a state’s ability to regu-
late the medical profession.19 Although legislatures typically give great
deference to medical professionals to establish standards of care, states heav-
ily regulate the licensure requirements for mental health professionals, such
as family therapists, social workers, and school psychologists.20
A public policy commitment to de-stigmatizing LGBT youth also
motivates legislatures to enact anti-SOCE measures.21 Legislators give great
weight to reports and statements from well-respected scientific and profes-
sional associations that show the harmful effects of these stigmatization ef-
forts, and they cite those materials in the text of the bills themselves.22 For
example, the co-sponsor of the Pennsylvania bill alluded to this motivation
in a press release, emphasizing that SOCE serve little purpose other than
tormenting at-risk youth: “[t]his is not science; it’s science fiction. This is
not about treatment; it’s about punishment.”23
C. Current Status of Constitutional Challenges to the SOCE Bans
After California passed its SOCE ban for minors in 2012, opponents
of the ban challenged the law in two different actions. The first, Welch v.
Brown,24 was filed on October 1, 2012, in the Eastern District of California.
The plaintiffs were current and future licensed mental health professionals;
they were represented by the Pacific Justice Institute, a Sacramento-based
legal defense organization that specializes in the “defense of religious free-
19. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 27, Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2013)
(quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992)).
(“[W]here speech is ‘part of the practice of medicine,’ it is ‘subject to reasonable
licensing and regulation by the State.’”).
20. See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 45: 1-1 - 16A (establishing New Jersey’s power to regu-
late certain professions and providing examples).
21. See, e.g., S. 1172 § 1(a), 2011-12 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (codified at CAL. BUS.
& PROF. CODE § 865) (“Being lesbian, gay, or bisexual is not a disease, disorder,
illness, deficiency, or shortcoming.”).
22. See id. § 1(a) (“The major professional associations of mental health practitioners
and researchers in the United States have recognized this fact [that LGB identity is
not a disease or disorder] for nearly 40 years.”).
23. J. Rudy Flesher, Watch: Rep. Brian Sims to Introduce Ban on Reparative Therapy in
Pennsylvania, NEW CIV. RTS. MOVEMENT (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.thenewcivil
rightsmovement.com/watch-rep-brian-sims-to-move-ban-on-reparative-therapy-in-
pa/legislation/2013/09/18/75296.
24. Complaint, Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2012) (No.
2:12-cv-02484-WBS-KJN).
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dom, parental rights, and other civil liberties.”25 District Judge William
Shubb granted the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction on De-
cember 3, 2012.26
The second action, Pickup v. Brown,27 was filed on October 4, 2012,
also in the Eastern District of California. The plaintiffs in Pickup were un-
disclosed minors seeking SOCE, their parents, licensed mental health pro-
fessionals, the National Association for Research and Therapy of
Homosexuality (“NARTH”), and the American Association of Christian
Counselors (“AACC”). On December 4, 2012, Judge Kimberly Mueller de-
nied the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction.28 Given the similar
subject matter, Pickup was combined with Welch on appeal before the Ninth
Circuit. On August 29, 2013, a three-judge panel for the Ninth Circuit
reversed the preliminary injunction granted in Welch, affirmed the Pickup
denial of preliminary injunction, and remanded the cases for further pro-
ceedings.29 As a result, California’s ban on SOCE for minors is currently
good law.
In New Jersey, Governor Chris Christie signed into law a similar ban
on SOCE for minors on August 19, 2013. Just three days later, King v.
Christie challenged the ban in federal court.30 The plaintiffs in King were
licensed mental health professionals, NARTH, and the AACC, and were
represented by Demetrios Stratis, an attorney in private practice in New
Jersey. On November 8, 2013, Judge Freda L. Wolfson granted the defen-
dant’s motion for summary judgment.31 The plaintiffs appealed the judg-
ment to the Third Circuit, which upheld the conversion ban in a
unanimous opinion in September 2014.32
25. About Us, PAC. JUST. INST., http://www.pacificjustice.org/about-us.html (last visited
Oct. 2, 2014).
26. Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Welch, 907 F. Supp.
2d 1102 (No. 2:12-cv-02484-WBS-KJN).
27. See Complaint, Pickup v. Brown, No. 2:12-CV-02497-KJM-EF (E.D. Cal. Oct. 4,
2012), 2012 WL 5981507.
28. See Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Pickup, No. 2:12-
CV-02497-KJM-EF (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012).
29. Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2013).
30. See Complaint, King v. Christie, 981 F. Supp. 2d 296 (D.N.J. 2013) (No. 3:13-cv-
05038-FLW-LHG).
31. See Complaint, King, 981 F. Supp. 2d 296 (No. 3:13-cv-05038-FLW-LHG).
32. King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014). The opinion uses a
similar analysis as the 9th Circuit in Pickup, finding that therapist-patient communi-
cation constitutes conduct, and does not violate the First Amendment.
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II. FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIMS
In all three lawsuits, the plaintiffs opposing the SOCE bans bring sev-
eral claims under the First Amendment, including the freedoms of speech
and religion.33 Additionally, the plaintiffs claim that three general parties are
injured: the minor patients, the minors’ parents, and professionals providing
SOCE.34 In their SOCE opinions the federal courts focused heavily on the
freedom of speech claims, analyzing whether therapy using exclusively
speech (“talk therapy”) constitutes professional conduct or protected speech.
The plaintiffs also raised secondary First Amendment claims surrounding
freedom of association and religious liberty, but courts quickly dismissed
these claims, focusing their analysis instead on freedom of speech.35
A. Freedom of Speech Claims
Central to all the SOCE plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims is a literal
interpretation of “free speech” because many SOCE techniques involve
“talk therapy,” a conversational style of therapy that involves a patient talk-
ing aloud about his or her issues with a therapist who intervenes to offer
suggestions and reframing.36 This type of therapy aims to overcome a minor
patient’s unwanted feelings by discussing aloud his or her issues relating to
sexual orientation or gender identity.37 Opponents of the SOCE ban allege
that it violates the freedom of speech of both the counselor and the minor
patient. With respect to the counselor, the plaintiffs reason that the coun-
selor has a protected right as a professional both to announce a preference
for therapy in line with his or her religious and moral convictions as well as
to provide that therapy through constitutionally protected speech with con-
senting patients.38 For the minor patient, the plaintiffs allege that the pa-
tient has a protected right to talk through his or her concerns about sexual
orientation.
33. See generally Complaint, King, 981 F. Supp. 2d 296 (No. 3:13-cv-05038-FLW-
LHG); Complaint, Pickup, No. 2:12-CV-02497-KJM-EF, 2012 WL 5981507;
Complaint, Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2012) (No.
2:12-cv-02484-WBS-KJN).
34. Complaint, King, 981 F. Supp. 2d 296 (No. 3:13-cv-05038-FLW-LHG); Com-
plaint, Pickup, No. 2:12-CV-02497-KJM-EF, 2012 WL 5981507; Complaint,
Welch, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (No. 2:12-cv-02484-WBS-KJN).
35. See, e.g., Pickup, 728 F.3d at 1058 (“[W]e conclude that the freedom of association
also does not encompass the therapist-client relationship.”).
36. See, e.g., Complaint at 19, King, 981 F. Supp. 2d 296 (No. 3:13-cv-05038-FLW-
LHG).
37. Mike Airhart, John Paulk: Proud to Be Ex Ex Gay, EX-GAY WATCH (May 3, 2014),
http://www.exgaywatch.com/2014/05/john-paulk-proud-to-be-ex-ex-gay/.
38. Counselors claim that it would be unethical for them to try to impose their own
personal viewpoint on an unwilling client. King, 981 F. Supp. 2d at 322 n.24.
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Central to this argument is a plain reading of the First Amendment,
on which some commentators urge that “one-on-one advice and counseling
be protected as free speech.”39 As a result, the New Jersey District Court
stated, “[t]he threshold issue before the Court is whether A3371 [the New
Jersey bill banning SOCE] regulates constitutionally protected speech.”40
Importantly, although both California and New Jersey’s bills banned all
forms of SOCE, the plaintiffs’ claims in both cases focus exclusively on “talk
therapy,” and do not contest the constitutionality of bans on other forms of
SOCE.41
In analyzing the Pickup plaintiffs’ free speech claim, the Ninth Circuit
determined that talk therapy in the California SOCE ban is “a regulation of
professional conduct.”42 In making this determination, the court relied on
the plain language of the statute, which defines the covered therapeutic
practices narrowly: “Senate Bill 1172 defines SOCE as ‘any practices by
mental health providers that seek to change an individual’s sexual orienta-
tion . . . .’ ”43 Further, violating the ban results only in professional repri-
mands, reflecting the statute’s core purpose of targeting conduct which
would be outside the bounds of acceptable licensed conduct. The court also
drew a distinction between speech that constitutes professional conduct,
such as SOCE, and non-professional speech, like expressing an opinion on
same-sex attractions or a referral to a non-licensed religious leader.44
Both the New Jersey and California courts found that such regulation
occurs in all sorts of professions, and that the First Amendment primarily
protects speech in the context of public debate. For example, “[a] lawyer
may be disciplined for divulging confidences of his client, even though such
disclosure is pure speech.”45 The reasoning behind this fairly obvious point
relied on the underlying assumptions around the First Amendment that
“[w]hen professionals by means of their state-issued licenses, form relation-
39. Paul Sherman & Robert McNamara, Protecting the Speech We Hate, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/10/opinion/protecting-the-
speech-we-hate.html?_r=1&.
40. King, 981 F. Supp. 2d at 312.
41. In fact, the plaintiffs in King v. Christie argue that “the parade of horribles derived
from aversion techniques, such as electroshock treatments . . . have not been used by
any ethical and licensed mental health professionals in decades, and . . . mental
health professionals who engage in such practices should have their licenses revoked.”
Complaint at 18, King, 981 F. Supp. 2d 296 (No. 3:13-cv-05038-FLW-LHG).
42. Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2013).
43. Pickup, 728 F.3d at 1049 (citations omitted).
44. See Pickup, 728 F.3d at 1049-50. But see Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 814 F. Supp. 2d
1367, 1373 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (holding a Florida statute which barred physicians from
inquiring about patients’ gun ownership to be unconstitutional violation of physi-
cians’ free speech).
45. Pickup, 728 F.3d at 1055.
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ships with clients, the purpose of those relationships is to advance the wel-
fare of the clients rather than contribute to public debate.”46 As a result, the
Ninth Circuit found that “the communication that occurs during psychoa-
nalysis is entitled to constitutional protection, but it is not immune from
regulation.”47 The Ninth Circuit added that the ban does not regulate the
expression of personal opinions about the moral appropriateness of SOCE,
making the law content and viewpoint neutral, a very important conclusion
for the court’s constitutional analysis: “Even if the licensing scheme [for
mental health professionals] . . . [is] regulated speech, it did not trigger strict
scrutiny because it was both content neutral and viewpoint neutral.”48
The Ninth Circuit consequently proceeded with a rational-basis re-
view of the free speech claim. A variety of legal standards can govern free
speech claims, depending on the context. In public dialogue about public
concerns, speech receives the strongest protection; mid-level protection is
given to professional speech within a professional relationship; and the least
protection is afforded to regulation of professional conduct where that regu-
lation has only an “incidental effect on speech.”49 The Ninth Circuit ap-
plied the lowest standard, because the court held that SB 1172 “bans a form
of medical treatment for minors; it does nothing to prevent licensed ther-
apists from discussing the pros and cons of SOCE with their patients.” As a
result, the First Amendment “does not prevent a state from regulating treat-
ment even when that treatment is performed through speech alone.”50 The
ban “regulates only treatment while leaving mental health providers free to
discuss and recommend, or recommend against, SOCE,” and as a result any
effects on free speech are inherently incidental.51
The Ninth Circuit found, under rational basis scrutiny, that the legis-
lature rationally could have determined that SOCE for minors was a public
health risk because it relied on qualified scientific determinations, such as
the American Psychological Association’s Task Force on Appropriate Thera-
peutic Responses to Sexual Orientation and a wide variety of professional
groups of mental health providers and counselors.52 In particular, the legis-
46. Pickup, 728 F.3d at 1055 (citations omitted).
47. Pickup, 728 F.3d at 1052 (citations omitted). Although Welch v. Brown found that
fundamental speech rights were violated, implicating strict scrutiny, the decision was
overturned by the Ninth Circuit. 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 320–26 (E.D. Cal. 2012).
The Ninth Circuit found that no fundamental speech right was violated, and used a
rational basis inquiry.
48. Pickup, 728 F.3d at 1052.
49. Pickup, 728 F.3d at 1055.
50. Pickup, 728 F.3d at 1055–56.
51. Pickup, 728 F.3d at 1056.
52. See S. 1172 § 1, 2011-12 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (codified at CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE § 865) (the American Psychological Association’s Task Force on Appro-
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lature acted rationally in balancing the “overwhelming” amount of evidence
against SOCE versus “some evidence that SOCE is safe and effective.”53
Therefore, the court had “no trouble concluding that the legislature acted
rationally by relying on that consensus [against SOCE].”54
The Ninth Circuit was careful to describe the ways that a similar law
might have violated the First Amendment, even though the current law had
not.55 For example, although the law prohibits the talk therapy that consti-
tutes most SOCE, the law does not prohibit communication between the
therapist and minor regarding the appropriateness of SOCE, or even refer-
rals to SOCE providers in other states: “Here, unlike in Conant [wherein a
district court struck down a federal law banning doctors from recom-
mending marijuana as treatment], the law allows discussion about treat-
ment, recommendations to obtain treatment, and expressions of opinions
about SOCE and homosexuality.”56 Thus, the court found, the purpose of
the statute is to regulate conduct, and does not dip into the more difficult
territory of regulating viewpoints or the content of speech.57 As a result the
court “need not decide whether SOCE actually causes ‘serious harms’; it is
enough that it could be ‘reasonably be conceived to be true by the govern-
mental decisionmaker.’”58 The New Jersey court agreed that SOCE bans
address conduct, and not speech.59
B. Plaintiffs’ Other First Amendment Claims
Although the King plaintiffs (but not the California plaintiffs) argued
that the religious beliefs of counselors providing SOCE were substantially
burdened “because [the SOCE ban] prohibits them from providing spiritual
priate Therapeutic Responses to Sexual Orientation concluded that “[s]exual orienta-
tion change efforts (SOCE) pose critical health risks to lesbian, gay, and bisexual
people”); see also Assemb. 3371 § 1(d), 215th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2012) (codified
at 2013 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. § 45:1–54) (“The American Psychiatric Association
published a position statement in March of 2000 in which it stated: ‘Psychothera-
peutic modalities to convert or “repair” homosexuality are based on developmental
theories whose scientific validity is questionable.”).
53. Pickup, 728 F.3d at 1057.
54. Pickup, 728 F.3d at 1057.
55. Pickup, 728 F.3d at 1057.
56. Pickup, 728 F.3d at 1056 (citation omitted); see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,
198 (1991) (holding that regulation preventing government funds from being used
to discuss abortion does not violate providers’ First Amendment rights because it
merely requires the separation of abortion discussion from government-funded
project).
57. Pickup, 728 F.3d at 1050.
58. Pickup, 728 F.3d at 1050.
59. See King v. Christie, 981 F. Supp. 2d 296, 320 (D.N.J. 2013).
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counsel and assistance on the subject matter of same-sex relationships,”60
the New Jersey court dismissed these claims.61 The King court determined
that the proper standard of analysis was whether the law is “neutral and of
general applicability, [and thus] it need not be justified by a compelling
government interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a
particular religious practice.”62 Addressing this standard, the court found
that the government action in this case is neutral because the SOCE ban
satisfies the standard that “a law is neutral if it does not target religiously
motivated conduct on its face or as applied in practice.”63
The court further explained that the New Jersey SOCE ban “on its
face . . . is neutral,” because it “makes no reference to any religious practice,
conduct, or motivation.”64 The plaintiffs disagreed, asserting that there is a
lack of neutrality with regard to therapy because the statute exempts affirm-
ative therapies, such as therapies that allow the minor patient to explore his
or her sexual identity and therapies that facilitate a gender transition. The
court quickly dismissed this argument stating, “there can be no serious
doubt that the Legislature enacted [the ban] because it found that SOCE
‘poses critical health risks’ to minors.”65 Further, the tailoring of the law,
which is aimed at regulating the medical conduct of licensed professionals,
does not attempt to “suppress, target, or single out the practice of any relig-
ion because of religious conduct.”66 As a result, the court found that the ban
does not sweep too far into protected religious rights.
Lastly, the King plaintiffs claimed that the freedom of association be-
tween the minor and his or her therapist had been compromised.67 How-
ever, this claim was quickly dismissed, as “SB 1172 does not prevent mental
health providers and clients from entering into and maintaining therapeutic
relationships,” and further “the therapist-client relationship is not the type
of relationship that the freedom of association has been held to protect.”68
60. King, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 331. Notably, the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Pickup does
not address free exercise claims.
61. The King court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ free-speech claims, using a similar analy-
sis as the Ninth Circuit. King, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 330.
62. King, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 331 (quoting Church of the Lukumi Bablu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993)) (internal citations omitted).
63. King, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 331 (quoting Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebe-
lius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394, 410 (E.D. Pa. 2012)).
64. King, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 331.
65. King, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 332 (quoting Assemb. 3371, 215th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J.
2012) (codified at 2013 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. § 45:1-54)).
66. King, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 332.
67. Complaint at 43, Pickup v. Brown, No. 2:12-CV-02497-KJM-EF (E.D. Cal. Oct.
4, 2012), 2012 WL 5981507.
68. Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042, 1058 (9th Cir. 2012).
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C. Outer Boundaries of First Amendment Analysis
Although the Ninth Circuit has held that California’s authority to
regulate mental health counselors includes barring them from providing
harmful care, it has implied that a less carefully tailored law might implicate
greater scrutiny.69 The New Jersey plaintiffs in King questioned the tailoring
of the New Jersey ban, arguing that the court should apply intermediate
scrutiny as enunciated in United States v. O’Brien, because the law burdens
expression but is content neutral.70 However, under O’Brien, a “sufficiently
important government interest in regulating” the nonspeech element of a
course of conduct that includes both speech and nonspeech elements “can
justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”71 The King
court drew on language from the Ninth Circuit in Pickup, noting that if the
SOCE ban has an effect on speech then “it is no more than incidental.”72
Therefore, in order for the bans on SOCE for minors to trigger tougher
scrutiny, the laws would have to impact speech directly by, for example,
prohibiting all statements by therapists on the subject of SOCE.
Moreover, the form of the legislation itself targets therapists via licen-
sure requirements,73 and it does not sweep broadly into protected expressive
conduct.74 The law does not prohibit SOCE during all mental health coun-
seling, such as counseling by a spiritual leader or via informal therapy.75 The
New Jersey court held that this narrow tailoring was evidence that the bill
regulates professional conduct and does not implicate wider opinions of the
role of LGBT people in society.76 However, ban opponents alleged illicit
motives, claiming that California is actually attempting to suppress opinions
69. Pickup, 728 F.3d at 1055.
70. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
71. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
72. King v. Christie, 921 F. Supp. 2d 296, 321 n.21 (D.N.J. 2013).
73. Some have argued that the therapist-client relationship is inherently commercial, and
thus a commercial speech approach should be taken. See, e.g., Shawn L. Fultz, Com-
ment, If It Quacks Like a Duck: Reviewing Health Care Providers’ Speech Restrictions
Under the First Prong of Central Hudson, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 567 (2013). However,
the commercial speech standard is a significantly lower one than ordinary First
Amendment claims, and as a result is not discussed in this Note.
74. See King, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 326.
75. Perhaps tort claims may arise, using California’s public policy as evidence of a breach
of professional duty. However, that is outside the scope of the legislation and this
Note.
76. See King, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 326.
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that counter public policy,77 but courts generally do not examine deeply a
statute’s purpose if a rational basis can be theoretically construed.78
Because laws that impact speech directly are more likely to infringe
upon the First Amendment, the New Jersey court first determined whether
the legislation intended to regulate speech or conduct. The court distin-
guished the two by stating that:
To be clear, the line of demarcation between conduct and speech
is whether the counselor is attempting to communicate informa-
tion or a particular viewpoint to the client or whether the coun-
selor is attempting to apply methods, practices, and procedures
to bring about a change in the client—the former is speech and
the latter is conduct.79
As a result, the tension lies in whether the legislature is banning SOCE as
expressive conduct (more like speech), or if it is a more mainstream scien-
tific regulation of public health. Here, the court concluded that the purpose
of the legislation was the latter. However, if legislatures veered closer to the
regulation of expressive conduct of mental health therapists by, for example
forbidding them from discussing SOCE, these laws would become more
problematic. Indeed, courts have struck down analogous restrictions of the
doctor-patient relationship in medicinal marijuana,80 abortion,81 and physi-
cian-assisted suicide cases.82
77. See, e.g., News Release, Parents and Friends of Ex-Gays and Gays, US Supreme
Court Asked to Strike Calif. Ban on Sexual Orientation Change Efforts (Mar. 19,
2014) (“This law [California SOCE ban] is trying to advance a socio-political
agenda . . . .”), available at http://www.pfox.org/us-supreme-court-asked-to-strike-
calif-ban-on-sexual-orientation-change-efforts/.
78. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (“[T]his Court will not strike
down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative
motive.”). But see Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1117–18 (E.D. Cal.
2012) (holding that SB 1172 lacks content and viewpoint neutrality, and therefore is
likely unconstitutional under the First Amendment), rev’d, Pickup v. Brown, 728
F.3d 1042, 1061–62 (9th Cir. 2012).
79. King, 981 F. Supp. 2d at 319.
80. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 638–39 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the federal
government could not prohibit California doctors from recommending marijuana
for medical purposes under California’s medicinal marijuana law).
81. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 650 F. Supp. 2d 972 (D.S.D.
2009) (holding that South Dakota’s law mandating abortion providers to advise that
there is a link between abortion and depression did not violate the First Amendment,
because the court defers to a legislature to determine what studies are reliable), rev’d,
686 F.3d 889, 906 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
82. See, e.g., Final Exit Network, Inc. v. State, 290 Ga. 508, 510–11 (2012) (holding
that Georgia cannot prohibit the advertising of physician-assisted suicides).
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III. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CLAIMS: PARENTAL RIGHTS
A. Articulations of the Parental Rights Claim
The plaintiffs’ complaints also allege injury to another party—parents
whose minor children wish to undergo SOCE. Federal courts generally have
given great deference to parental interests in supervising and directing the
upbringing of their children. For example, in the abortion context, a unani-
mous Supreme Court found that “[s]tates unquestionably have the right to
require parental involvement when a minor considers terminating her preg-
nancy, because of their strong and legitimate interest in the welfare of their
young citizens, whose immaturity, inexperience, and lack of judgment may
sometimes impair their ability to exercise their rights wisely.”83 This protec-
tion of parental rights in the abortion context indicates that a more basic
interest is at issue: “The child is not the mere creature of the State; those
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the
high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”84 This
parental right to guide the upbringing of their children generally is pro-
tected against the unreasonable uses of power of the government: “[L]iberty
may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting the public interest,
by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to
some purpose within the competency of the State to effect.”85 However, this
parental right parallels the natural duties parents have toward their children,
to protect their health and guide their education: “[C]orresponding to the
right of control, it is the natural duty of the parent to give his children
education suitable to their station in life.”86
Although controversial, courts have even found that parents have the
power to sterilize their developmentally disabled children who would not be
able to consent to such a procedure for themselves.87
83. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of No. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 326 (2006)
(quoting Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444–45 (1990)) (internal citations
omitted).
84. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
85. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
86. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400.
87. In re Lora Faye Wirsing, 573 N.W.2d 51, 55 (Mich. 1998) ( “[T]he ward is unable
to choose for herself whether she wishes to become pregnant. To deprive her of the
option of sterilization, in addition to affronting the statute, would make the choice
for her, and make the same choice for each ward, regardless of circumstances.”).
Although the court here is using a “substituted-judgment” analysis because the ward
is not able to make an informed decision on her own behalf, the irreplaceable posi-
tion of the parents, who instituted the action on their daughter’s behalf, implicates a
strong degree of state deference to the parents’ decision-making.
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However, parental freedoms do not trump all state action, and regulation by
the state is particularly salient in the public health context, where the safety
or health of the child or other community members is at risk. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has stated that “neither the rights of religion nor rights of
parenthood are beyond limitation,” and this right to religion “does not in-
clude liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease
or the latter to ill health or death.”88 In line with the special interest the
states have in the health of their youths, the Eastern District of California
found in Welch that the “state has a compelling interest in protecting the
physical and psychological well-being of minors.”89
SOCE ban opponents in Welch and Pickup challenged the SOCE bans
under substantive due process theories primarily based on this view of pa-
rental rights. However, the Welch plaintiffs’ complaints also alleged that
“[t]he right to privacy recognizes that government has limited authority to
restrict the ability of citizens to access information and services related to
their personal autonomy, identity, and sexuality.”90 Although the constitu-
tional right to privacy famously has been utilized in the sexual and repro-
ductive rights context to expand the legality of contraception,91 abortion,92
and intimate conduct,93 plaintiffs’ complaints notably do not cite Lawrence,
Baird, Roe, or Casey,94 presumably so as to not give credence to precedent
with which they disagree.
B. Courts’ Analyses of Plaintiffs’ Substantive Due Process Claims
In both the California and New Jersey cases, parental rights claims
received only cursory, if any, consideration. The courts generally found the
plaintiffs’ free speech claims to be more compelling. For example, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals focused primarily on First Amendment claims,
and then only secondarily on parental rights.95 When it did discuss parental
rights, the court articulated the limitations of these parental rights, finding
88. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944).
89. Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1118 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted), rev’d, Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042, 1061–62 (9th Cir.
2013).
90. Complaint at 67, Welch, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (No. 2:12-cv-02484-WBS-KJN) .
91. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
92. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
93. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
94. See infra Part IV.
95. See Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2013). As a rudimentary sample, the
Circuit panel spends approximately five pages discussing First Amendment protec-
tions of freedom of speech and expressive association and merely one and a half
pages discussing substantive due process protections of parental rights. A further one
and a half pages discuss void-for-vagueness and overbreadth claims.
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that “the fundamental rights of parents do not include the right to choose a
specific type of provider for a specific medical or mental health treatment
that the state has reasonably deemed harmful.”96 Similarly, in Welch v.
Brown,97 Judge William B. Shubb devoted his analysis exclusively to the
contours of free speech jurisprudence, rarely mentioning parental rights at
all. Rather, the opinion focused on First Amendment concerns, such as the
rights of children to be exposed to different ideas and the state’s restriction
of viewpoints. Lastly, Judge Freda Wolfson in King v. Christie entirely omit-
ted the issue of parental rights, focusing her opinion solely on First Amend-
ment claims of free speech and free exercise—perhaps because those claims
were more at the crux of the alleged constitutional injury.98
In contrast, Judge Kimberly J. Mueller in the Eastern District of Cali-
fornia focused her opinion in Pickup v. Brown much more heavily on sub-
stantive due process protections,99 and she addressed both privacy and
parental rights concerns. However, her privacy analysis largely ends with
holding both that there is “no constitutional right of access to particular
medical treatments reasonably prohibited by the government”100 and that
“California’s governmental interest in protecting public health, deriving
from its police power, enables it to prohibit certain treatments without in-
fringing on plaintiffs’ fundamental privacy rights.”101 Additionally, the
opinion utilized the traditional parental rights analysis in Prince and Meyer,
holding that “[the] fundamental parental interest . . . is not without limita-
tion . . . The state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom
and authority in things affecting the child’s welfare; and . . . this includes, to
some extent, matters of conscience and religious conviction.”102 The court
concluded that these parental rights are limited because “states have a com-
pelling interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of
a minor.”103
96. Pickup, 728 F.3d at 1061.
97. Welch, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2012).
98. King v. Christie, 981 F. Supp. 2d 296 (D.N.J. 2013).
99. See Pickup v. Brown, No. 2:12-CV-02497-KJM-EFB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
172034 (E.D. Cal. 2013), aff’d, 728 F.3d at 1061–62.
100. Pickup, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172034, at *35 (citing with approval Abigail Alliance
for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695
(D.D.C. 2007)).
101. Pickup, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172034, at *79–80.
102. Pickup, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172034, at *59.
103. Pickup, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172027, at *59–60 (quoting New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982) (internal citations omitted)).
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C. Outer Boundaries of Parental Rights Claims
As a baseline, courts give high deference to parental decision-mak-
ing.104 However, as discussed previously, this deference has limitations when
a state finds potential harm to the minor or threats to public safety.105 This
boundary to parental rights reflects the strong entrenchment of general po-
lice powers to regulate issues regarding public health and safety: “The pres-
ervation of the public health is one of the duties devolving on the state as a
sovereign power. In fact, among all the objects sought to be secured by
governmental laws, none is more important.”106 Therefore, this protection
of the minors’ psychological health trumps protected parental rights.
Legislation regarding public health generally receives broad judicial
deference unless it infringes on constitutional rights. As a result, legislative
findings that SOCE harm minors reinforce that regulations barring SOCE
meet legal standards that the legislation be “grounded in the methods and
procedures of science,”107 and consequently the legislature is not targeting a
medical practice as a proxy for impermissible aims.
Because legislation may not contravene constitutional rights, the tai-
loring of the law plays a significant role in its constitutionality. For example,
in the District Court’s analysis of Pickup, the court defines the right at issue
as the right to select a “specific mental health treatment that the state has
deemed harmful to minors,”108 and not the plaintiffs’ asserted right of par-
104. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–69 (2000) (“[T]here will normally be
no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further
question the ability of that parent to make the best decision concerning the rearing
of that parent’s children.”); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304 (1993) (“[S]o long as
certain minimum requirements of child care are met, the interests of the child may
be subordinated to the interests of other children, or indeed even to the interest of
the parents or guardians themselves.”); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.
632, 639 (1974) (“This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice
in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due
Process Clause”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (“Even more mark-
edly than in Prince, therefore, this case involves the fundamental interest of the par-
ents, as contrasted with that of the State, to guide the religious future and education
of their children.”).
105. Pickup, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172027, at *60.
106. 39 AM. JUR. 2d Health § 1 (2012). See, e.g., Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173
(1910) (“[T]he police power of the States extends to the regulation of certain trades
and callings, particularly those which closely concern the public health.”); Gonzales
v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he structure and
limitations of federalism . . . allow the states great latitude under their police powers
to legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all
persons.”) (internal citations omitted).
107. Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364, 380 (Mont. 1999).
108. See Pickup, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172027, at *62.
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ents to determine the “care, custody, and control of their children.”109 How-
ever, if the legislature retailored the law from medical regulations into a
general ban on negative statements by parents about LGBT children, that
law would come closer to interfering with parental upbringing. Such a blan-
ket ban would be unconstitutional even if California justified the ban with a
public policy identifying that “[b]eing lesbian, gay, or bisexual is not a dis-
ease, disorder, illness, deficiency, or shortcoming,”110 and that social stigma
of LGBT people was harmful to public health because “[m]inors who expe-
rience family rejection based on their sexual orientation face especially seri-
ous health risks.”111 The California legislature, however, interferes only
minimally with protected parental rights because SB 1172 “bars parents
only from seeking [SOCE] through state-licensed mental health profession-
als . . . [and] does not enact a comprehensive and total ban; parents still can
seek SOCE or its equivalent through religious institutions or other unli-
censed providers.”112
Importantly, California’s law stays within the realm of regulation, and
does not impose criminal sanctions for any of the parties involved, includ-
ing the therapist, the minor, or the minor’s parents.113 As a result, the court
concluded that the State is acting narrowly in the service of public health
without interfering into more fundamental parental decisions, such as the
acceptance or rejection of LGBT children. If the legislature were to extend
its power beyond regulation of public health and into the realm of substan-
tive and generalized parental decisions about rearing children, then it likely
would be overstepping its existing authority into protected constitutional
rights.
IV. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CLAIMS: PRIVACY AND SEXUALITY:
A POTENTIAL CLAIM FOR SOCE BAN OPPONENTS
Although the Welch, King, and Pickup plaintiffs cited substantive due
process violations of parental rights, the plaintiffs conspicuously did not
make claims based on substantive due process rights of privacy, reproduc-
tion, and sexuality. Notably, the Supreme Court has stated that “our laws
and tradition afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing,
and education,” holding that “the Constitution demands for the autonomy
109. See Pickup, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172027, at *62.
110. S. 1172 § 1(a), 2011-12 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (codified at CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 865).
111. Id. § 1(m).
112. Pickup, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172027, at *65–66.
113. Pickup, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172027, at *65–66.
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of the person in making these choices.”114 Superficially at least, if the Con-
stitution affords protection of “choices central to personal dignity and au-
tonomy”115 by way of sexual intimacy, then the Constitution may also
protect choices related to attempts to change one’s sexual orientation. After
all, “[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”116
An expansive reading of such a broad-based liberty interest in defining one’s
existence could include attempts to change one’s sexual orientation.
However, courts would likely rebuff attempts to attack SOCE bans on
these sorts of theories for several reasons. First, the State retains police pow-
ers that allow it to protect individuals from harming themselves.117 Second,
such an interpretation misrepresents a key aspect of recent Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence, namely the Court’s increasing concern with the
dignity of LGBT people.118 Third, and most importantly, because SOCE
bans do not apply to adults, the State’s power to infringe on a minor’s
privacy rights is significantly stronger.119
Lawrence v. Texas famously held that “[w]hen sexuality finds overt ex-
pression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but
one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected
by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this
choice.”120 However, the Court deliberately granted such a liberty to
adults,121 expressly noting that the “case does not involve minors.”122 A
broader notion of LGBT people is fundamental to this holding that certain
intimate conduct is beyond the reach of the state: the notion that the State
cannot take control of LGBT individuals’ destinies by making their inti-
mate relations a crime.123 Some might argue that SOCE bans attempt to
subordinate certain LGBT people—those attempting to change their sexual
114. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003).
115. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 851 (1992)).
116. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
117. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 294–95 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (discussing the common law’s historic bar on suicide).
118. Such concern stems from a reading of the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses
together. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558;
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
119. See supra Part II.C. Individuals who pursue SOCE may not see the therapy as self-
harm, but rather as alleviating suffering. However, adults have more advanced emo-
tional and legal decision-making abilities, and states that bar SOCE for minors per-
ceive the therapy as posing too great of a risk to minors’ mental health.
120. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
121. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
122. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
123. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
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orientation or gender identity. But in fact, the LGBT movement has her-
alded SOCE bans as “protect[ing] LGBT youth from so-called therapists
who use dangerous and discredited practices.”124 Further, the bans notably
do not bar adult LGBT individuals who choose to engage in SOCE, and
only protect the most at-risk LGBT people: minors.
Opponents of SOCE bans also may argue that the bills subordinate
“ex-gays,” noting that “every day brings new hostile acts against the ex-gay
community under the justification of fighting ‘hate’ against homosexu-
als.”125 However, claims that “[giving] sexual orientation protection to one
group while excluding another is discriminatory”126 would have difficulty
gaining traction considering that sexual orientation is not (yet) a protected
class, and SOCE bans are facially neutral. Further, the social science com-
munity has achieved consensus that SOCE do not actually change one’s
sexual orientation.127 As a result, judicial scrutiny would hinge on recogni-
tion that attempting to change one’s sexual orientation is a fundamental
right “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”128 SOCE ban opponents
would have to argue that the Fourteenth Amendment protects a right to
attempt to change one’s underlying sexual desires.
However, the State has more leeway in the minor context for regulat-
ing rights that originate in the Due Process Clause. For example, the Su-
preme Court has announced that states “unquestionably” may require
parental involvement when a minor considers an abortion because of the
states’ compelling interest in the welfare of minors.129 Although the parental
notification requirements in abortion legislation presume adverse desires be-
tween the girl and her parents, the State may intervene to protect a minor
even when that intervention goes against the wishes of the parent.130 Apply-
ing this logic to SOCE, the State would have the power to ban procedures
for minors, even if the parents strongly support the therapy for their minor
child.
124. Andy Towle, Bills Introduced to Ban ‘Ex-Gay’ Therapy for Minors in New York, TOWL-
EROAD (Jan. 14, 2014, 10:25 AM), http://www.towleroad.com/2014/01/bills-intro
duced-to-ban-ex-gay-therapy-for-minors-in-new-york.html.
125. Media Advisory, Parents and Friends of Ex-Gays & Gays, Ex-Gay Legislation Intro-
duced in Hate Crimes Bill (Apr. 11, 2005), available at http://www.freerepublic
.com/focus/f-news/1382382/posts.
126. Id.
127. Brief for the American Psychological Association et al. as Amicus Curiae on the
Merits in Support of Affirmance at 9–10, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652
(2012) (No. 12–144).
128. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937)).
129. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Ne. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 326 (2006).
130. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 946–47 (1992).
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V. PROJECTING FORWARD: WHAT DO SOCE BANS MEAN
FOR THE LGBT MOVEMENT?
LGBT advocates have strongly supported SOCE bans not only be-
cause they protect LGBT youth from “harmful psychological abuse and so-
called reparative ‘therapy,’”131 but also for preventing “shame about an im-
mutable characteristic of their nature.”132 Thus, the work SOCE bans do is
two-fold: (1) protecting the most vulnerable members of the LGBT com-
munity (namely, adolescents with particularly unsupportive parents) from
direct harm; and (2) pushing a wider de-stigmatization campaign, whereby
prejudice is isolated as irrational, and social inclusion of LGBT people be-
comes mainstream. In that sense, the law changes the conversation from one
of permissible differences of opinion to a matter of technocratic regulation
by the state aimed at preventing social harms. More specifically, within the
existing constitutional context, advocacy against SOCE bans does major
work in establishing a core premise of LGBT legal reform: establishing
LGBT identity as an immutable and fundamental part of a person’s
identity.133
The LGBT movement has not always had such a central focus on
public identity as a basis for legal reasoning. Early LGBT advocacy focused
on sexual privacy, grounded in notions that “[the past fifty years] show an
emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons
in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to
sex.”134 This privacy-based argument reflected the idea that sexual intimacy
was at the core of the expression of one’s humanity, rather than sexual iden-
tity. In these early days of the movement, when so few straight people knew
openly LGBT people, sexual intimacy (generally defined) was often the only
common ground that could be established to recognize the humanity of
LGBT people. This had advantages as well as disadvantages; although sexual
intimacy is a near-universal experience, it is not generally a topic for polite
society. This public stigma became particularly evident during the HIV/
AIDS crisis of the 1980s – 1990s, which forced tens of thousands of men
131. Press Release, Equal. Cal., Sen. Ted Lieu, Author of Bill Banning Conversion “Ther-
apy” in CA, to Receive Ally Leadership Award at Los Angeles Equality Awards (Sept.
20, 2013), available at http://www.eqca.org/site/apps/nlnet/content2.aspx?c=kuLRJ9
MRKrH&b=8492711&ct=13313829.
132. Press Release, Garden State Equal., Federal Court to Hear Summary Judgment Mo-
tion on New Jersey Conversion Therapy Ban (Oct. 2, 2013), available at http://www
.gardenstateequality.org/2013/10/federal-court-to-hear-summary-judgment-motion-
on-new-jersey-conversion-therapy-ban/.
133. See, e.g., Andrew Sullivan, The Scalia-Walker Convergence, DISH (Aug. 4, 2010, 6:40
PM), http://dish.andrewsullivan.com/2010/08/04/the-scaliawalker-convergence/.
134. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003).
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out of the closet,135 and which stirred conversations of mortality and sexu-
ally transmitted diseases, topics that most people preferred not to discuss in
public.136
Contemporary LGBT advocates, in contrast, have moved away from
framing sexual freedom around sexual expression and intimacy. Rather, they
have instead created a model seeking identity-based civil and social recogni-
tion. In this model, the project moves away from the freedom per se to
transgress sexual or general norms, and towards a model where LGBT peo-
ple already exist in a sort of state of nature, and seek civic and social recogni-
tion based on this identity.137 This contemporary model highlights LGBT
identity as simply a variation within nature and seeks equality based on that
identity, rather than liberating LGBT people from systems of power and
identity that are mystified as ‘natural’ to begin with.138 The goal of the
movement shifts into constructing a legal identity as something permanent
and ‘true,’ rather than questioning legal categories of gender and sexuality as
inherently problematic or oppressive as a starting point. This shift has not
only occurred in the wider LGBT cultural movement, but it has been ob-
served in the wider constitutionalization of the LGBT movement as well.139
This shift towards constitutional law thus plays a direct role in “privileg[ing]
more moderate movement factions, tactics, and goals over more radical
135. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH,
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 39 (2013).
136. For an account of the various tactics used by AIDS activists to overcome these barri-
ers, see HOW TO SURVIVE A PLAGUE (Production Square Films 2012). See also
LINDA HIRSHMAN, VICTORY: THE TRIUMPHANT GAY REVOLUTION 176–85
(2012).
137. Compare CAST OF THE ROCKY HORROR PICTURE SHOW, SWEET TRANSVESTITE
(Ode Records 1975) (“Don’t get strung out/ By the way I look,/ Don’t judge a book
by its cover/ I’m not much of a man by the light of day,/ but by night I’m one hell of
a lover”), with ARCADE FIRE, WE EXIST (Merge Records 2013) (“They walk in the
room/ And stare right through you/ Talking like/ We don’t exist/ But we exist”). The
first song, from the musical Rocky Horror Picture Show, expresses the pride that Dr.
Frank-N-Furter feels when he transgresses social norms in gender presentation, and
when he engages in sexual conduct with another man. The second song, inspired by
recent anti-LGBT violence in Jamaica, is a fictional story of a teenage son ‘coming
out’ to his father. It expresses the notion that staying in the closet will not stop the
son from being gay, but rather would cause him to feel as if his real self is invisible.
138. Such a deconstructionist approach is often adopted by queer theorists. See, e.g.,
JUDITH BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER 212 (2004) (“My effort was to combat forms
of essentialism which claimed that gender is a truth that is somehow there, interior
to the body, as a core of as an internal essence, something that we cannot deny,
something which, natural or not, is treated as given.”).
139. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
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ones,”140 leading to less of a traditional leftist critique, of gender as an inher-
ently oppressive system, and more of a typically liberal request for “equality
of political rights, which is the first mark of American citizenship.”141 Con-
sequently, this frame of protecting minors from harmful therapy superfi-
cially unites moderate (equality-based) and more radical (liberationist)
elements, but papers over much of the framing struggle within the move-
ment itself about what the very goals of the LGBT movement are. More
specifically, the law does not answer the question of whether SOCE is bad
because it shames minors for experiencing sexual feelings, which more radi-
cal elements see as inherently problematic, or because it creates a status of
inferiority on the basis of being LGBT. Even if the law prefers an equality
norm to a liberationist one, the law certainly does work on both fronts.
A. “Disgust” to “Dignity”
Within this legalist framework of LGBT identity, prominent political
theorist Martha Nussbaum has observed a shift in wider political discourse
of LGBT identity from a notion of ‘disgust’ to a ‘politics of humanity.’142
Disgust, commonly associated with ‘dirty’ objects, often includes revulsion
to bodily fluids, including blood, fecal material, and sexual fluids. Unsur-
prisingly, Nussbaum observes the politics of disgust were particularly promi-
nent in the context of the LGBT movement during the 1970s sexual
revolution and the height of HIV/AIDS activism of the 1980s and early
1990s, during which advocates framed their goals as ones of sexual freedom
and wellness.143 The politics of disgust “has a dual goal: to inspire simple
revulsion and loathing for gay [and bisexual] men, and to link their prac-
tices to disease and danger,”144 which “help to justify laws that disadvantage
that group.”145 Although the disgust principle is generally facially unaccept-
able as a basis for lawmaking,146 it becomes present even at the highest level
140. Douglas NeJaime, Constitutional Change, Courts, and Social Movements, 111 MICH.
L. REV. 877, 895 (2013) [hereinafter NeJaime, Constitutional Change, Courts, and
Social Movements] (citing Catherine Albiston, The Dark Side of Litigation as a Social
Movement Strategy, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 61, 74–76 (2011)).
141. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 1
(1991).
142. I adopt the terminology of “disgust” and “politics of humanity” from Martha Nuss-
baum’s book FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY (2010). I adopt the term “dignity”
from Justice Kennedy’s famous descriptions of constitutional protections. See, e.g.,
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567; United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013).
143. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 142, at 180–81.
144. Id. at 5.
145. Id. at 8.
146. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (“[T]he amendment seems
inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class that it affects; it lacks a rela-
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of constitutional lawmaking, as seen in Bowers v. Hardwick: “Condemna-
tion of those practices [same-sex sodomy] is firmly rooted in Judaeo-Chris-
tian moral and ethical standards . . . This is essentially not a question of
personal ‘preferences’ but rather of the legislative authority of the State.”147
Earlier generations of LGBT legal activists disagreed strongly with the con-
clusion that the State has a legitimate interest in privileging some prefer-
ences over others, even if the court largely adopts their frame of sexual rights
located in constitutional notions of privacy.
Nussbaum notes that what she terms the ‘politics of disgust’ as ex-
pressed in Bowers was replaced by ‘the politics of respect’ in Lawrence v.
Texas, which overruled Bowers: “When sexuality finds overt expression in
intimate conduct with another person, the conduct is but one element in a
personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitu-
tion allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.”148 Although
couched in language of ‘sexual choices,’ Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Law-
rence discusses sexuality not in language of disgust or immorality, but rather
in terms of a close personal relationship between two people. This shifts the
conceptual framework from discussing sexual preferences towards some-
thing more fundamental: human dignity. This shift reflects that the idea of
the government recognizing already-existing relationships has a substantially
different legal meaning than pure sexual freedom. Advocacy on behalf of
SOCE bans reflects a similar, Lawrence-esque analysis; there are LGBT peo-
ple who already exist and have legal rights, rather than a vision in which all
people exist (regardless of social identity) and make a wide variety of differ-
ing sexual decisions, and it is puritanical to privilege some over the other.
In a broader sense, SOCE bans are not only humanist attempts to
protect vulnerable members of society from harm, but rather are larger at-
tempts at safeguarding the dignity of the LGBT people as a whole. Dignity
is a concept often referenced in LGBT constitutional law. It has its roots in
the Civil Rights movement, which used political discourse as a tool to hu-
manize and restore dignity to marginalized populations. As President John-
son remarked in supporting the 1964 Civil Rights Act, “We cannot deny to
a group of our own people the essential elements of human dignity which a
majority of our citizens claim for ourselves.”149 This dignity is not merely a
tionship to legitimate state interests”). Although it is unclear if animus per se is
disqualifying, or merely a legal nullity, animus regardless fails the rational basis test.
147. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196–97 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring), over-
ruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
148. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
149. Bruce Ackerman, Dignity is a Constitutional Principle, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/30/opinion/sunday/dignity-is-a-constitutional-
principle.html?_r=0.
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permissible legislative motive, but also cuts to the core of the principle of
constitutional equality. Famously, Brown v. Board used extensive social sci-
ence data showing that the humiliation that African-American schoolchil-
dren experienced in attending segregated schools had not only a social
science dimension, but also a constitutional one, because it created “a feel-
ing of inferiority as to their [the children’s] status in the community that
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone,”150
which creates “a deprivation of the equal protection of the laws.”151 The
LGBT movement has continually drawn on this constitutional tradition to
protect against the deprivation of dignity,152 such as that which occurs
through SOCE.
SOCE imply that LGBT status is pathological, which has tremen-
dously harmful effects on LGBT youth writ large, not just those experienc-
ing SOCE. This notion of LGBT ‘sickness’ includes notions of inferiority,
low self-esteem, and alienation,153 and falls in line with historical trends of
what Nussbaum identifies as “disgust-based subordination.”154 Certainly, if
the government performed SOCE on LGBT youth, that practice would run
afoul of constitutional principles. However, under current SOCE bans, the
state is exercising proactive powers to protect vulnerable members of society,
as well as endorsing a politics of equal respect. This re-framing allows us to
rethink “legal treatments of sexual orientation, just as this fundamental
value [of equal respect] earlier entailed a rethinking of issues of religion,
race, and gender.”155 As a result, banning SOCE accomplishes a key politi-
cal goal of shifting the political framework away from ‘LGBT deviation’
from the ‘heterosexual norm’ into a baseline norm that includes a wide
diversity of sexual and gender identities.156 Such a legislative action is consis-
tent with the larger goal of anti-subordination and a politics of equal re-
spect, which already exist within the American legal framework. This shift is
not only a framing one, but also strategic, requiring compliance with ex-
150. Brown v. Bd. Of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
151. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
152. See, e.g., Craig J. Konnoth, Note, Created in its Image: The Race Analogy, Gay Iden-
tity, and Gay Litigation in the 1950s–1970s, 119 YALE L.J. 316, 322 (2009) (“Ulti-
mately, gay rights as we understand them today would make very little sense without
a fundamental reliance on concepts and arguments formed through reliance on the
racial justice movement.”).
153. See generally APPROPRIATE THERAPEUTIC RESPONSES TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION,
supra note 6.
154. NUSSBAUM, supra note 142, at 22.
155. Id. at 35.
156. See, e.g., EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 92 (1990)
(“There is a homosexual in this text [Billy Budd]– a homosexual person, presented as
different in his essential nature from the normal men around him.”).
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isting legal principles rather than a more fundamental constitutional
change.157
Notably, SOCE bans regulate conduct among private actors, touching
on personal decisions about one’s self-acceptance. As a result, substantive
due process could do additional work for SOCE ban opponents, because
decisions about sexual identity are intensely connected with wider notions
of one’s role within the universe. Such a vision embraces stricter individual-
ized conceptions of liberty whereby one should generally able to do what
one desires, so long as there is no harm to anyone else. However, American
constitutional law on privacy notably does not embrace such a strict liberta-
rian vision, and adopts a dignity-central approach.158 Thus, although Gris-
wold famously discusses “penumbras” of privacy, the liberty interests
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are not fully separated into due
process and equal protection zones. The home is not “a kind of govern-
ment-free zone”159 where all choices are allowed. Rather, the decisional lib-
erty protected by due process combines with non-subordination principles
(including dignity) and the state’s police power to create a larger govern-
mental interest.
Although states may infringe on privacy rights in the context of SOCE
bans, such minor intrusions on privacy are justified to protect minors from
harm in the specific context and to protect against the subordination of
LGBT people in the wider context. Courts have generally reasoned that
they “need not decide whether SOCE actually causes ‘serious harms’; it is
enough that it could be ‘reasonably be conceived to be true by the govern-
mental decisionmaker,”160 but one can speculate that were sexual orienta-
tion or gender identity not immutable, the case for a minor’s decisional
liberty would be much stronger.
Consequently, although the courts do not have a case in which the
State itself is impermissibly enforcing stigma, the SOCE ban cases are an
important landmark in the judiciary’s general rejection of the stigmatization
of LGBT people. Such a bar on state-sanctioned stigma is not, of course,
found in the text of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, this reading of
the Fourteenth Amendment is largely guided by notions that impermissible
identity-based stigma “is designed to prevent both irrational and unfair in-
157. See, e.g., Mario L Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and Future Equal Protec-
tion Doctrine?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1059 (2011).
158. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare
Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1895 (2004) (“the Constitution’s
elusive but unquestionably central protections of liberty, equality, and—underlying
both —respect for human dignity.”).
159. NUSSBAUM, supra note 142, at 75–76.
160. Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042, 1057 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal citations omitted).
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fliction of injury.”161 The Court has identified this fairness principle most
notably in the context of the cases challenging discriminatory laws against
illegitimate children, where the Court recognized that “[i]mposing disabili-
ties on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system
that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility
or wrongdoing.”162 The Supreme Court has accordingly disfavored laws
based on the irrational view that families containing illegitimate children are
somehow less worthy in the eyes of the government.163 As a result, “[W]hat
is really at issue is not the immutability as such, but irrelevance to the pur-
pose at hand.”164 States like California and New Jersey have found that
SOCE reflects a similarly irrational affront to dignity: these efforts are over-
whelmingly unsuccessful, and serve the sole purpose of stigmatizing at-risk
youth.
The SOCE bans create space for an emerging recognition of the “dig-
nity as free persons” that all individuals enjoy.165 Such dignity is not merely
confined to one’s home, where sexual intimacy is expressed, but also has a
public aspect, namely social status. For example, the Defense of Marriage
Act, which barred federal recognition of valid same-sex marriage, took away
“a dignity and status of immense import,” that resulted in “injury and in-
dignity” which violated an “essential liberty protected by the Fifth Amend-
ment.”166 Notably, this liberty interest is not only present in the private
aspect of marriage; DOMA “undermines both the public and private signif-
icance of state-sanctioned same-sex marriages.”167 SOCE bans resonate with
this constitutional conception of dignity not only because they protect the
innermost vulnerability of a person’s mind, but also because they affirm the
equal dignity of LGBT individuals.
B. SOCE Bans as an Organizational Tool
The campaign for SOCE bans allows the LGBT movement to accom-
plish a public relations goal as well. By highlighting the stories of the strug-
gles of some of the most vulnerable LGBT populations, the bans draw
attention to the broader ideological goals by way of specific grievances, al-
161. Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV.
1, 6 (1976).
162. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
163. See New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Reed v. Camp-
bell, 476 U.S. 852, 854–55 (1986).
164. NUSSBAUM, supra note 142, at 119.
165. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
166. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2681 (2013).
167. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694.
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lowing advocates to make demands.168 This accomplishes the goal of put-
ting legislators, and the public, in someone else’s shoes. By enabling people
“to imagine what gays and lesbians are pursuing, and see it as relevantly
similar to their own search for personal and sexual integrity and expression,”
the LGBT movement lays the groundwork to achieve a ‘politics of human-
ity.’169 Achieving this politics of humanity syncs with a broader constitu-
tional purpose of equal protection, namely non-subordination. After all, the
categorization of people often “embod[ies] a legacy of hierarchy and there-
fore cannot be permitted to stand.”170 Moreover, publicly highlighting the
grievances of vulnerable LGBT people serves two other interconnected
goals: mobilizing constituents to support LGBT advocates’ cause and defin-
ing substantive goals of the movement.
SOCE bans reflect a larger reality of the LGBT movement, namely its
multidimensional approach to social reform. In contrast to the traditional
scholarly focus on marriage equality litigation, LGBT advocacy has been
multidimensional, moving the ball forward on whatever field is most recep-
tive. Although litigation has been critical to securing key victories, lawyer-
activists generally recognize that litigation is only one part of a larger strat-
egy in accomplishing the movement’s goals.171 Particularly in the American
system, where power is dispersed among different branches and levels of
government, LGBT lawyer-activists have seized on a multidimensional ap-
proach that appreciates this disjointed structure.172 Although marriage liti-
gation has been an enormously helpful tool in bringing awareness to the
LGBT movement, few movement leaders perceive it as being an indispensa-
ble demand of the LGBT movement. For example, Evan Wolfson, a leader
of the marriage equality movement, observes that “[w]hat we needed and
called for and built was an affirmative and sustained campaign that reflected
what I described repeatedly as the four multi’s: multi-year, multi-state,
multi-partner, and multi-methodology” in order to accomplish a wider goal
of LGBT equality.173
CONCLUSION
Federal courts have largely approved efforts to ban SOCE for minors,
finding that the bans have been tailored carefully to prevent incursions into
168. NeJaime, Constitutional Change, Courts, and Social Movements, supra note 140, at
892.
169. NUSSBAUM, supra note 142, at 48.
170. Id. at 45.
171. Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941, 945 (2011).
172. Id. at 989.
173. Evan Wolfson, Where Perry Fits in the National Strategy to Win the Freedom to Marry,
37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 123, 125 (2013).
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protected constitutional rights. Although the legislation approaches existing
constitutional limitations on First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, the
careful molding of public health regulations to the articulated purposes of
protecting LGBT minors accomplishes the public policy goal entirely with
permissible governmental powers. Further, LGBT advocates have pursued
SOCE bans as part of a larger campaign of destigmatization, attacking the
pathologization of LGBT identity as a proxy for wider social acceptance of
LGBT people. By doing so, LGBT advocates have reframed the discussion
of LGBT issues from a discussion of sexual practices to one of political
identity and dignity, leading to greater success within existing constitutional
doctrine.
